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Abstract 
Much attention has been paid to government ‘blunders’ and ‘policy disasters’. National 
political and administrative systems have been frequently blamed for being disproportionately 
prone to generating mishaps. However, little systematic evidence exists on the record of 
failures of policies and major public projects in other political systems. Based on a 
comparative perspective on blunders in government, this article suggests that constitutional 
features do not play a prominent role. In order to establish this finding, this article (a) 
develops theory-driven expectations as to the factors that are said to encourage blunders, (b) 
devises a systematic framework for the assessment of policy processes and outcomes, and (c) 
uses fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis to identify sets of causal conditions associated 
with particular outcomes (i.e. blunders). The article applies this novel approach to a set of 
particular policy domains, finding that constitutional features are not a contributory factor to 
blunders in contrast to instrument choice, administrative capacity and hyper-excited politics. 
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Why do governments blunder? 
Political science has always been interested in the question as to why things go wrong in 
government. Ranging from the search for a remedy to the ‘peculiar American difficulty in 
organizing administration’ (Wilson 1887, p. 498), the diagnoses of policy instability due to 
adversary politics (Finer 1975), the study of ‘joint decision traps’ (Scharpf 1988), stalemated 
political systems (Crozier 1971), explorations into why implementation goes awry (Pressman 
and Wildavsky 1973) to more comparative attempts at explaining policy fiascoes (Gray and ’t 
Hart 1998), scholars have been pre-occupied with identifying policy episodes perceived as 
cases of poor performance. Insights from individual episodes are used to suggest wider 
systemic flaws inherent in the particular (national) political system in question. The 
conclusion of many such accounts of blunder-prone government is, in turn, advocacy of 
political reform. This paper assesses whether political system, or constitutional features really 
matter in generating severe ‘blunders’ by looking at a set of 23 government blunders across 
seven political systems. Using Ragin’s (2000; 2009) fuzzy set qualitative comparative method 
(fsQCA), it assesses different theoretical explanations regarding underlying factors associated 
with severe government blunders. The analysis suggests that it is combinations of alternative 
factors rather than constitutional factors alone that better account for major policy blunders.  
 
The claim that the constitutional features of a political system matter is usually compounded 
by self-flagellating critiques of blunders as a uniquely national disease. For example, Schuck 
(2015) argues that government failures are a consequence of deep structural factors associated 
with the dysfunctional US political system. Similarly, Paul Light (2016) emphasizes the 
accelerating incidence of policy breakdown due to disinvestment in the bureaucratic capacity 
of US federal government combined with effects of partisan polarization. King and Crewe 
(2013) claim that Britain’s political system is distinctly prone to large-scale, avoidable and 
expensive policy mistakes. This follows a tradition suggesting that policy-making in Britain is 
impeded by its constitutional features of strong one-party government, over-confidence of 
  
political and administrative elites and an absence of checks and balances (Finer 1975; 
Dunleavy 1995; Moran 2001). 
 
A number of problems arise from this line of approach. One is that emphasis on constitutional 
features as main source for blundering often reflects the political viewpoint of the analyst in 
their respective political system. In Britain, this emphasis goes hand-in-hand with advocacy 
for a more representative form of electoral democracy, in Germany criticism focuses on the 
intricate intergovernmental relationships between state and federal governments (Scharpf 
1988), and in the US on institutional gridlock caused by partisan polarization (Hacker and 
Pierson 2010). Political systems are either said to be ‘gridlocked’, requiring greater 
pluralization and a dose of majoritarianism, or they are alleged to be unrepresentative, hyper-
active and over-centralized, requiring more consensus.  
 
A second problem is that such accounts seem to suggest that particular systems are peculiarly 
prone to major policy blunders without any real comparative perspective (Gray 1996). While 
each jurisdiction may generate blunders in a distinct way, it is neither evident that any one 
country is lonely at the top when it comes to severe government blunders and dysfunctionality 
nor that countries are in the same race when it comes to things going wrong. A third problem 
is that these arguments are usually generated by the study of national experiences alone, based 
on the wisdom of hindsight. A final problem is the definition of a ‘blunder’. It is difficult to 
define relevant time periods, declared intentioned outcomes may conceal other motives and 
side-effects, and initial blunders might turn into triumphs (Hall 1980). This continues to be a 
focus of debate in studies of policy success and failure (Bovens et al. 2001; Bovens and ‘t 
Hart 2016; McConnell 2010; 2016; Hood et al. 2016; Resordihardjo et al 2016). This paper 
does not dispute the diagnosis of ‘blunder’ in any of our cases (we use ‘blunder’, ‘failure’, 
‘fiasco’, ‘breakdown’ and ‘disaster’ interchangeably). We develop a comparative study of 
blunders which focuses, on the one hand, on the severity of blunder, and, on the other hand, 
  
assesses the strength of competing theoretical explanations for why governments blunder. Our 
central question is, therefore, whether particular political systems generate a different quality 
of blunder.  
To address this question, this paper undertakes a comparative study of the conditions 
associated with severe blunders by government. It first develops a theoretical framework that 
draws on the existing literature on the sources of policy failure. Second, it develops a novel 
approach, based on Ragin’s (2000; 2009) fuzzy-set QCA, to identify sets of causal conditions 
associated with major policy blunders (as contrasted with cases of non-severe blunders). 
Third, this paper describes coding and sampling procedures for our cases. Fourth, we discuss 
and analyze 23 government blunders. These are drawn from six jurisdictions in a defined 
range of domains: namely policies and projects associated with high reversal costs, such as 
public buildings, transport infrastructure, IT projects, benefits and tax systems, and aerospace 
and defense projects. 
 
PERSPECTIVES ON GOVERNMENT BLUNDERING 
While the claim that constitutional features generate particular types of blunders has been 
widely explored, alternative theoretical explanations exist. Premised on key claims put 
forward in the literature, we develop a typology of four complementary perspectives on 
government ‘blundering’ by distinguishing between sources of blundering on two dimensions. 
First, we distinguish whether supposed blunders are caused by the choices of individuals, or 
by actors whose actions are channeled through the inherent characteristics of politico-
administrative systems (such as the ‘Westminster system’). Second, we point to the 
alternative effects of resource depletion, in other words, we differentiate between sources of 
blundering that point to the absence of particular pre-requisite resources or where resource 
depletion affects blundering, and those where resource issues do not matter. Table 1 
  
summarizes our typology of four sources of policy blundering. We explore each of these 
perspectives in more detail below. 
 
Table 1: A Typology of the Sources of Government Blunders 
 Limited Resource 
Dependence 
Resource Dependence 
Blunder due to particular choices Hyper-Excited Politics Instrument Choice 
Blunder due to underlying 
structures/systemic features 
Constitutional System Administrative Capacity 
 
 
In the case of hyper-excited politics the source of failure lies in intentional choices by 
individuals or groups of individuals. This choice is associated with moral panics (Cohen 
1972), ‘Pavlovian politics’ (Lodge and Hood 2002) and other external pressures that make 
politicians and officials rush policy announcements only to repent at leisure when these 
commitments turn out to be counter-productive, more costly than expected, fail to achieve 
intended outcomes, or generate no interest (Breyer 2003). Examples include policy over-
reactions to perceived risks such as mobile phones or high profile announcements to provide 
public funding for flood victims which are never taken up. Similarly, the context of iconic or 
symbolic politics is often associated with hyper-excited blundering (Moran 2001; Flyvbjerg et 
al. 2003). Politicians (and senior administrators) in the realm of high politics are motivated by 
the possibility of creating signature projects or legacies (whether this is in terms of buildings, 
enduring reforms to welfare or tax systems, events or other high-profile projects) and, 
therefore, are prone to optimism bias in discounting potential disadvantages and costs. 
Specifically, ‘fast-thinking’ (Kahneman 2013) by key decision-makers acting under political 
pressure may make them vulnerable to cognitive biases, such as disproportionately ‘locking-
on’ to particular bits of information (Jones and Baumgartner 2005).  
 
Blundering due to particular structural features of the constitutional system is, as noted, often 
put forward as accounting for the record of failure in British central government (Dunleavy 
  
1995; King and Crewe 2013). Similarly, the literature on ‘credible commitment’ and ‘veto 
points’ has suggested that some political systems are more likely to witness policy reversals 
than others, and therefore to be more prone to U-turns and other policy inconsistencies 
(Weaver and Rockman 1993; Tsebelis 2002). The propensity towards ‘strong government’ is 
seen as problematic as it reduces deliberation opportunities and the information available to 
decision-makers, as well as failing to check over-enthusiastic and over-confident executives. 
While, therefore, majoritarian systems are often seen as problematic, a similar case can be 
made for consensus systems. Here, the threat of gridlock, the need to bargain and seek 
consensus are seen as delaying decisions, requiring side-payments and pork-barreling, and 
slowing down the business of government (Scharpf 1988).  
 
Instrument choice as a source of blundering is associated with explanations that suggest the 
wrong tools for the job have been chosen. Policy instruments differ in terms of their degree of 
‘coerciveness’ and ‘depletability’ (Hood and Margetts 2007). Accordingly, blunders are 
caused, or could be avoided, because inappropriate or sub-optimal methods, such as a 
regulatory standard or economic incentive (e.g. taxes, subsidies) are chosen to achieve the 
desired effect. Similarly, the use of highly punitive and visible punishment might require the 
creation of a particular enforcement machinery, but also trigger resistance and avoidance, 
requiring, in turn, further repressive organizational tools. Elsewhere, the use of long-term 
fixed contracts, such as in the case of public-private partnerships, may shift the financial 
burden from current to future generations (something which could interact with cognitive 
biases, such as the hyperbolic discounting of future costs). Indeed, instrument choice also 
links to the institutional machinery required for ‘making this happen’, and therefore points to 
the dispersion of responsibility for particular activities. Similarly, Pressman and Wildavsky 
(1973) noted how the ‘wrong’ instrument, namely one with too many ‘clearance points’, was 
inevitably leading to a disappointing policy outcome.  
 
  
Finally, blunders are associated with a lack of administrative capacity. This relates to 
bureaucratic organization and competence. Accordingly, blundering may emerge due to 
dysfunctional oversight activities, insufficient resources to engage at the policy frontline, an 
inability to bring together and maintain a diverse set of actors, or failures of imagination due 
to a lack of technical capacity to process information and forecast trends. 
 
Whereas instruments relate to the resource implications of particular modes of policy 
intervention, administrative capacity relates to the skills and capabilities that are expected to 
exist within bureaucracies. Therefore, a lack of administrative capacity is defined by the 
absence of relevant and suitable skills within public and private organizations, issues with 
communication and co-ordination within and across organizations in the design and delivery 
of policies, and the ability to monitor ongoing policies and projects. Information-gathering, -
sharing and -processing are inherently demanding and resource-intensive, especially in the 
context of governments’ scarce attention (Jones and Baumgartner 2005). A lack of co-
ordination capacity might be said to lie at the heart of failures of collaboration between 
different state and non-state bodies. For example, silos in cross-agency intelligence sharing 
were identified by the 9/11 Commission as a key factor in the failures that led to the attack on 
the US. In the British context, Dunleavy (1995) identifies the loss of institutional memory due 
to an almost never-ending cycle of administrative restructuring and reform as a major limit on 
administrative capacity. A lack of capacity might also be linked to a lack of staff in policing 
certain activities. For example, a lack of civil service expertise in procurement is often blamed 
for cost overruns in major IT projects and large defense contracts (e.g. Dunleavy et al. 2006). 
 
A METHOD FOR ANALYSIS 
Problems of selecting on the dependent variable are well-established as this gives rise to no-
variance in the outcome variable (King et al. 1994). These problems pose a potential danger 
in studies of policy disasters which focus on high-profile cases. For our purposes, however, 
  
examining a sample of prominent policy blunders displaying qualitative differences in kind of 
severity from across a range of contexts provides a test of the necessary and sufficient 
conditions for the occurrence of severe blunders. In other words, selecting a set of known 
blunders enables us to determine whether there is an observable pattern of contributing factors 
that reveal similarities or differences across a range of contexts and underlying conditions 
(Dion 1998). Our cases are, therefore, drawn from a number of policy domains and countries. 
A broadly shared definition of policy blunders suggests that these are large-scale errors of 
either omission or unintended consequences (Hall 1980; Gray 1996; King and Crewe 2013; 
Light 2016).  
 
We identified cases which might be categorized as having been blunders in terms of cost and 
time in the following sorts of public policies or projects: (i) public buildings and stadiums, (ii) 
transport infrastructure, (iii) IT projects, (iv) benefits/tax systems and financial regulation, and 
(v) aerospace/defense projects. These domains are chosen as they represent those areas of 
government activity that have been widely identified in studies of domestic policy blunders 
and project failures (Dunleavy 1995; Moran 2001; Flyvbjerg et al. 2003; King and Crewe 
2013). These areas are different to other examples of failure, such as poor regulation, military 
follies and other foreign policy fiascos, or flawed welfare programmes. None of the decision-
making in these cases is likely to have directly caused death or disease. They therefore 
represent a different class of case. 
 
Crucially for our analysis, the severity of blundering varies considerably across the cases, 
distinguishing between extreme outliers in terms of completion and cost overruns and modest 
failures of management or decision-making that incurred smaller costs but rather more in the 
way of political embarrassment. Therefore, the composition of our sample enables us to 
consider what contributes to the most severe cases of policy blundering, compared to non-
severe cases (the former being potentially associated with higher political consequences than 
  
the latter). Thus, while some sort of policy failure is the scope condition that delineates our 
population (i.e. blunders), severe or non-severe blunder is the outcome we wish to explain.  
 
Ever since Peter Hall’s study of planning disasters, it has been recognized that the attribution 
of policy blunders and their severity is inherently contested and contestable (Bovens and ‘t 
Hart 1996; 2016). Our analysis is based on the classification of cases as severe and non-severe 
blunders according qualitative policy analysis (using a range of primary and secondary 
sources described below). Accordingly, our cases are assigned a score between 0.0 and 1.0 
representing their degree of membership in the set of severe blundering. This is not purely a 
measure of losses since it is impossible to calculate a universal unit of policy disaster (i.e. is a 
50% cost overrun better or worse than a one year delay in project completion?). Rather it 
indicates the overall severity of the failings of planners and managers (such as the extent to 
which cost inflation was foreseeable or the frequency with which warnings were missed). Our 
classification scheme for the severity of blundering draws upon Ragin’s (2000; 2009) method 
of qualitative comparative analysis (QCA), specifically the use of ‘fuzzy sets’; that is, sets 
where elements have varying degrees of membership (i.e. objects can be more ‘in’ or ‘out’ of 
a category). This approach recognizes that assessments as to what constitutes a blunder can be 
subject to nuanced interpretation.  
 
This study’s classifications are reported in Table 3 below and provide a basis for systematic 
comparison of the severity of blundering across cases. This classification scheme combines 
parsimony with fine-grained assessment to ensure that scoring is reliable and can be 
effectively moderated. Accordingly, scores range from a value of 0.0 where there was no 
blunder or where any mistakes were inconsequential, through routine under-performance 
against objectives (0.1), minor failures/botches relating to non-critical aspects of 
policy/project delivery (0.2), modest failures on one or multiple criteria of policy/program 
aims (0.4), substantial failures on single criteria of evaluation (0.6), major and embarrassing 
  
project/policy failures against multiple criteria (0.8), extreme outliers in terms of cost 
overruns or completion delays (0.9), to catastrophic project failures or abandonment (1.0). 
The classification of a value of 0.5 represents the ‘crossover point’ as the point of maximum 
ambiguity, where a case is simultaneously both ‘in’ and ‘out’ of a particular set. We do not 
include this mid-point in our classification scheme to avoid coding bias towards uncertainty, 
which would lead cases to be dropped and information to be lost. Our classification scheme 
thus differentiates between cases of non-severe (less than 0.5) and severe (greater than 0.5) 
blunders. The fuzzy membership scores assigned to these cases reflect complexity beyond 
dichotomous set-memberships while at the same time being transparent about judgements that 
have been made.
1
 Our choice of seven point scale enables variation in outcomes (and in 
conditions as described below) which is operationally valid with respect to the quality of 
information available for our cases. 
 
Having identified the policy domains, we identified a selection of high profile cases that were 
perceived as blunders (i.e. subject to some criticism or inquiry) either during or after the 
event, across a range of political systems.
2
 The countries involved reflect a range of state 
traditions and constitutional features, which provide variation in the associated conditions. 
Our cases are drawn from seven countries: Britain, France, the US, Germany, Canada, Russia, 
Australia; with some of the policies falling under the jurisdiction of national government and 
others being controlled by subnational, regional or local government. Through this country 
selection, we observe factors associated with policy disasters across federal-presidential and 
semi-presidential systems, and in unitary- and federal-parliamentary systems, as well as in an 
authoritarian state. Some of these cases are seen as variants of over-centralized systems 
                                                 
1
 A crisp-set type QCA would not provide for a similar kind of fine-grained analysis. 
2
 While our cases are drawn from an extended time period, our theoretical expectations are time-invariant, so we 
have no reason to expect that cases drawn from earlier points in time will have different features than those in 
later points in time. 
  
(Britain, France). Others are seen as producing ‘gridlock’ due to either inter-institutional (the 
US) or intergovernmental conflict (Germany). Canada combines both Westminster and 
intergovernmental gridlock features. Cronyism and corruption are often singled out as 
features of Russian government. Australia, despite its federalism, is said to suffer from 
features related to the Westminster system. This approach – where the ‘family’ of cases (i.e. 
perceived blunders)  is held constant, while leverage of relevant variation on the outcomes 
and key conditions is maximized – allows us to assess whether the presence or absence of 
particular conditions (i.e. instruments, system-features, hyper-excited politics or 
administrative capabilities) is common across cases. This further enables us to demonstrate 
the contingency associated with government blundering if common patterns are not observed.  
 
Categorizing Hyper-Excitement, Instruments, Constitutional Systems and Administrative 
Capacity  
Having identified a set of cases, we classify each of the conditions associated with occurrence 
of the policy blunder. This requires us to determine whether or not a particular condition is 
present in the case of a given policy blunder. For each case, then, we completed the relevant 
information for each of the quadrants in Table 2. This was based on a systematic review of a 
wide range of primary and secondary sources, including media coverage, official documents, 
government reports, parliamentary proceedings and existing studies (see online appendix).  
 
  
  
Table 2: Examples of Four Types of Government Blunder 
 Low Resource Implications High Resource Implications 
Blunder due to particular 
choices 
Hyper-Excited Politics: 
Short-term political response to a  
tabloid newspaper campaigns 
 
Political backing for a project 
designed to win over voters 
 
Ideological preference for a 
programme of privatization leads to 
disregard of evidence and/or 
opposition  
 
Project seen as a legacy for the 
politician making the decision to 
adopt or abandon it 
Instrument Choice: 
Use of a private finance initiative 
imposes a long-term financial burden 
on government 
 
Public/private partnership creates 
moral hazard where government bears 
the financial risk 
 
Reliance on private financing for a 
high risk venture with uncertain 
revenues 
  
Blunder due to underlying 
structures/systemic features 
Constitutional System: 
Policy/project not subject to 
sufficient checks and balances  
 
Fast-tracking of legislation possible 
due to the political system 
 
Complex political distribution of 
responsibility between national and 
local government creates ambiguity 
in implementation and blame 
avoidance behavior and/or generates 
gridlock  
Administrative Capacity: 
Bureaucrats inattentive to the 
development of problems with a 
project. 
 
Lack of capacity for subjecting initial 
budget forecasts to scrutiny. 
 
Government reliant on private firms 
and industry sectors for 
delivering/administering policy (e.g. 
security for major events) 
 
We then assign a fuzzy membership to the condition (taking a value between 0 and 1.0) which 
provides a subjective evaluation of the degree to which the condition was present in decision-
making leading to the blunder. On the basis of inspection of contemporaneous accounts and 
subsequent inquiries, this indicates our assessment of first whether, and second to what 
degree, each condition was present in the case. Not only does this enable systematic 
comparison across cases, it also enables the identification of multiple permutations of 
combinations of conditions that are associated with a particular output value. These 
classifications are reported in Table 3. These fuzzy set classifications range from a value of 
0.0 in the complete absence of the condition, to 1.0 where there is compelling and 
incontrovertible evidence of its role in the case.  
 
  
Table 3: Fuzzy Sets of Conditions and Severity of Blundering 
Score Conditions Outcome 
0.0 
Complete absence of condition (e.g. absolutely no 
evidence of Pavlovian politics) 
No blunder or mistakes inconsequential 
0.1 
Minimal presence of condition, and condition not 
mentioned in accounts of policy decisions (e.g. no 
suggestion of direct political involvement in decision) 
Relatively routine project under-
performance against objectives 
0.2 
Condition weakly present and no evidence for direct 
contributions to policymaking (e.g. high politics a 
superficial feature of case) 
Minor failures/botches relating to non-
critical or tangential aspects of 
policy/project delivery  
0.4 
Condition present but only indirectly linked to the 
case (e.g. constitutional politics sets context of 
blunder) 
Modest failure on one or multiple criteria of 
policy/program aims or isolated failures 
contrasted with overall success 
0.6 
Modest or aggravating factor, but primacy contested 
(e.g. bureaucratic under-capacity adds to failures of 
political oversight)  
Substantial failure on a single criteria of 
project evaluation or moderate failure 
across multiple criteria, some political 
embarrassment   
0.8 
Highly present but not decisively observable (e.g. 
some changes in project design substantially 
contribute to cost overrun but others do not) 
Major and embarrassing project/policy 
failure against multiple or key criteria 
0.9 
Substantial presence of condition, and 
heavily/critically identified in explanations of the 
case (e.g. technical features of infrastructure project 
fundamentally linked to the blunder) 
Extreme outlier in terms of completion 
delays or cost overruns 
1.0 
Compelling/incontrovertible factor (e.g. indisputable 
lack of capacity at fault for project non-delivery) 
Catastrophic project failure and/or 
abandonment (potentially system-level 
consequences) 
 
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF POLICY BLUNDERS 
Before returning to the fsQCA analysis, we describe in more detail the 23 blunders in light of 
the four theoretical perspectives outlined above. This also provides justification for the 
scoring of fuzzy-set memberships for the individual conditions underlying the findings. In the 
subsequent section we present the fsQCA analysis which considers how combinations of 
these conditions are present in cases of severe policy blunders. Details of the cases, and the 
basis for our classification, are summarized in the Online Appendix Table A1. 
 
Hyper-excited politics 
As noted, hyper-excited politics are associated with media pressure, moral panics or some 
form of over-enthusiastic commitment towards a particular policy or project. Among our 
  
cases, there is considerable evidence of politicians or governments making decisions in view 
of leaving a potential legacy. This is particularly the case with infrastructure projects, such as 
the Berlin airport or the Hamburg and Sydney concert halls. In the cases of the Sydney Opera 
House, Australian Parliament House, Millennium Dome and Scottish Parliament at Holyrood, 
political keenness to get projects off the ground before designs had been finalized or properly 
assessed was considered a factor in cost overruns and subsequent problems experienced in 
development of the project (for the Dome, which largely came in on budget, it meant the 
structure was built with little idea of the exhibition content that would eventually fill it). 
President Mitterrand's ambition to construct a national library as part of a series of ‘Grand 
Projets’ across Paris was similarly legacy-driven: the contract for le Bibliotheque Nationale 
de France was written in such a way as to ensure no future president could alter the plans 
(Fitchett 1995).  
 
The prospect of winning the right to host international mega-events, such as the Olympics, is 
often a trigger for hyper-excited politics as bids make over-optimistic forecasts of costs and 
economic benefits (Jennings 2012). The London, Montreal and Sochi Olympics were 
entangled with high politics and the aspirations of leaders at the national or local level to host 
grand spectacles (e.g. Hille 2014). While political enthusiasm might be a factor in the cases 
included in this study, it does not explain why politicians are able to mobilize support for 
some bids, but fail to do so for others; for example, popular resistance underpinned recent 
decisions by Boston, Oslo, Rome and Hamburg to withdraw from the competitions to host 
Olympic Games. At best, hyper-excited politics in the case of mega-events as well as large-
scale technical systems seem to require some encouragement from businesses, sporting 
authorities or other organized interests. Finally, many blunders are linked to policy-makers 
pursuing legacies that offer a symbolic political statement: such as providing a clear signal 
that devolution was irreversible through the construction of the Scottish Parliament (Fraser 
2004, p. 418), and to an extent to the desire of the British and French governments to 
  
demonstrate their technological and engineering prowess through the Concorde project in the 
1960s. The same applies to the German Transrapid project. This magnetic levitation-based 
technology was widely promoted as a 'technology of the future' that would also offer export 
opportunities to German industry. Ultimately, no link was ever built in Germany, but the 
continued political support for such a technology whose expected advantages were 
increasingly diminished by cheaper air-traffic and incremental advances in traditional rail 
technology points to a degree of hyper-excited politics.  
 
Hyper-excitement might therefore be a critical factor in defining the context in which 
decisions regarding major projects or policies are taken. Such a context is said to contribute to 
‘optimism bias’ (Flyvbjerg et al. 2003), leading to the adoption of risky projects and 
systematic under-estimation of project costs. Furthermore, hyper-excited politics also matters 
in terms of processes of project management throughout the construction process. The Sydney 
Opera House and Hamburg philharmonic orchestra building both suffered as a consequence 
of political excitement regarding the uniqueness of the original architectural designs and 
experienced considerable cost overruns. The use of pioneering construction techniques for 
Montreal's Olympic Stadium likewise contributed to cost overruns (COJO '78). Furthermore, 
the British-French inter-governmental agreement for Concorde meant that an inherently 
uneconomic project was persisted with despite its costs rising (giving rise to the term the 
‘Concorde fallacy’ to describe the escalation of commitments despite negative consequences). 
A similar dynamic in the case of the Dome set the stage for political embarrassment, but did 
not lead to construction problems.  
 
The desire to make a statement regarding unification and relocation of the German capital to 
Berlin provided the context of the long drawn-out construction process of a new airport for 
Berlin. Indeed, the urge to appear ‘modern’ by advocating supposedly new public-private 
partnerships, and deliver a reduced burden for taxpayers, was also at the heart of other 
  
contemporary policy disasters, as illustrated in the case of TollCollect. Here, ministers were 
keen to illustrate their ‘modern’ way of policy-making via delegating the development of the 
toll-collecting systems for road haulage to the private sector. Despite this, the project suffered 
delays and legal disputes with the contractor. This contrasts with the eventual abandonment of 
the Transrapid project. 
 
Not all our cases include high levels of hyper-excitement. One example is the long-term 
defense project, the Eurofighter. That project emerged in the context of the Cold War, and 
was criticized for not reflecting on Glasnost, let alone, even after 1989, the collapse of 
communism. The U-turn regarding the decision on the aircraft/carrier combination for 
Britain's Carrier Strike project resulted from a new government -- seeking to make savings for 
its austerity programme -- overturning a decision by its predecessor, only to later reverse its 
own decision as costs escalated. 
 
Constitutional dysfunction 
As noted, one of the standard accusations is that constitutional systems generate their own 
distinct dysfunctionalities. In our cases, constitutional systems are remarkably absent in 
shaping policy decisions: different political systems generate similar dynamics and results. 
The Sydney and Hamburg concert halls display rather similar planning features despite 
emerging in rather different federal contexts. Likewise, the new Scottish and Australian 
Parliament buildings experienced similar problems in procurement that were unrelated to their 
distinct political systems. Some policy blunders emerge as a result of international politics, 
such as the Eurofighter, where British government-influenced (and Rolls Royce-driven) 
technical specifications added further to the cost basis of the project. As in the cases of the 
British aircraft carriers and Concorde, international projects increased the reluctance to 
abandon projects or to reject continuous project amendments. 
  
The Millennium Dome was something of an exception; the decision to proceed with the 
project was taken in Cabinet at the instigation of the Prime Minister – absent of proper checks 
and balances – and with the Millennium Commission overriding assessments by their 
accounting officer that further bailouts to the floundering project could not be justified on 
‘value for money’ grounds (Moran 2001, p. 418). 
 
Adverse Instrument Choice 
Policy instruments come with their own particular vulnerabilities and side-effects. 
Instruments may therefore be exposed to changing fortunes in financial markets, they may be 
more or less open to demands for adaptation, mission creep or reversal, and they may be open 
to legal and other forms of contestation. For example global economic shocks impacted on the 
costs of construction of Montreal’s Olympic stadium and on private financing of the Olympic 
Village for the London 2012 Olympics where contracting firms withdrew from the project 
until financial risks had faded.  
 
Projects not associated with fixed prices or penalty clauses for contractors were seen as 
inevitably inviting cost increases. One of the key charges in construction of the Sydney and 
Hamburg opera halls was that ongoing technical refinements to designs were waved through 
by project managers. In contrast, the way in which initial contracts were written reduced 
incentives for later ‘cheating’ by contractors on Mitterrand’s national library project. The 
Australian Parliament House construction followed a ‘fast track’ procurement process similar 
to that for the Scottish Parliament (Fraser 2004; Audit Scotland 2004), which was ineffective 
in containing costs incurred by contractors.  
 
Most problems in instrument choices involved relationships with private firms. Spiraling 
costs of production (e.g. Eurofighter) or rising prospective operational costs (e.g. Concorde) 
led to cancellations that, in turn, triggered calls for compensation payments by industry. The 
delay in the introduction of the TollCollect system led to legal battles between the federal 
  
government and the private consortium. The project itself was, without much consultation, 
renewed in 2014 for a further three years (raising concerns about the too close relationship 
with industry). However, the very same industry was also pitted against the government in an 
ongoing legal battle over the federal government’s decision to withhold payments in lieu of 
lost earnings due to the initial project delays. These legal and secretive proceedings began in 
2005 remained unresolved at the time of writing (March 2016). 
 
Most of the processes covered in this study involved the creation of company-type vehicles 
that sought to manage the process of organizing the construction of the project in question. 
This sort of instrument was involved in the case of the Millennium Dome, Edinburgh’s tram 
system, both the Montreal and London Olympics, the Channel Tunnel, the Scottish 
Parliament building, the Sydney Opera House, and the Hamburg concert hall. Some cases 
were undertaken by government directly (the Bibliothèque nationale de France, Universal 
Credit and West Coast Main Line rail franchise competition). The key problem in these cases 
involved the capacity of arms-length vehicles to manage complex processes and to make 
choices about when to inform political principals about delays and over-runs. The Berlin-
Brandenburg airport differs from the other cases, in that the eventual choice followed a court 
ruling. The development of the Millennium Dome was delegated by government to a private 
company to build and operate the national exhibition. Similarly prominent was the role of 
initial instrument choice (franchising) by policy-makers in the case of the West Coast 
Mainline franchising episode. Perverse incentives generated by a complex franchising system 
meant that the initial winner of the franchise competition was encouraged to bid on highly 
optimistic terms with regards of future growth. 
 
More generally, the discretion of policy-makers to choose instruments is often severely 
constrained, in particular by EU state aid and competition rules. These added constraints and 
complexity, and therefore further sources for blundering. However, it is difficult to suggest 
  
that the contextual limits on instrument choice were solely at fault for the extent of blundering 
we observe. Instruments matter in the sense of introducing their own vulnerabilities and 
complexities; however, it is difficult to suggest that they were, on their own, responsible for 
generating policy disasters. 
 
Low Administrative Capacity 
As noted, administrative capacity is associated with a willingness to challenge and scrutinize 
proposals – and to deliver them in terms of coordinating actors, controlling them, and 
understanding technical and other choices. Across all our cases, it can be questioned as to 
why senior officials and politicians did not scrutinize proposals more deeply. For example, 
the West Coast Mainline rail franchising blunder was blamed on a lack of administrative 
capacity (see Transport Select Committee 2013; National Audit Office 2012). Civil servants 
were suspended, the lack of financial resources to employ consultants was bemoaned, the 
modelling behind calculations was questioned, the actual calculations were viewed as 
inaccurate, and the overall management of the process regarded as inappropriate, leading to 
the specific franchising decision to be reversed and the overall process of franchising to 
become politicized.  
 
The implementation of Britain’s Universal Credit scheme to simplify the system for working-
age benefits suffered badly from a high rate of turnover of senior leadership and a lack of IT 
expertise, along with a ‘fortress’ mentality among the programme team (National Audit 
Office 2013). Visitor and ticket sale forecasts for the Dome were also poorly estimated 
(National Audit Office 2000), while Home Office development of the identity cards scheme 
spent a substantial amount on contractors because it did not have ‘certain skill sets and 
resources necessary for implementation of a large and complex project such as Identity Cards’ 
(Science and Technology Select Committee 2006, p. 11). The lack of administrative capacity 
in these cases should also be seen in the context of a reduced capacity to recruit external 
  
expertise, demand by government for ‘good news’ in a hostile political environment, and the 
inherent complexity of each of the projects.  
 
Elsewhere, there was evidence of a lack of administrative capacity to stand up to political and 
interest group pressures, even though resistance to projects was well-informed and present. In 
the case of the Eurofighter project, the initial advocacy involved a manufacturer that was, at 
the time, part-owned by the Bavarian government. A lack of resources and a reluctance of 
government to engage with planners was said to have provided for a ‘waving through’ 
response to changes to technical specifications of the project, which led to cost overruns.  
In light of all this, policy blunders frequently emerged in the context of weak challenges to 
planning assumptions and awarding of green lights to complicated and risky projects due to a 
lack of depth in administrative scrutiny, whether due to political sensitivities, industry 
pressure, over-enthusiastic project designers or failure to manage disparate sets of agencies 
and contractors. More generally, though, none of these projects led to severe blunders simply 
because ‘the state’ was in charge. Budget forecasting and project management seemed to be 
problematic for both the public and private sectors. Shortcomings in administrative capacity 
were often down to a lack of interest and engagement by oversight boards, senior leadership, 
project teams and individual officials that structured problems experienced with these large 
projects. 
 
FUZZY SET ANALYSIS 
This section now turns to the fuzzy set analysis of the 23 cases. fsQCA is a qualitative 
comparative method based on identifying set-theoretic relations to examine the presence of 
conjunctions of conditions and particular outcomes (Ragin 2000; 2009; also see Schneider 
and Wagemann 2012). It first requires the measurement of both our dependent variable, the 
severity of the blunder, and our independent variables, the presence or absence of each of the 
four types of conditions. Table 4 presents a summary of all fuzzy set scores for our cases.  
  
Table 4: Summary of fuzzy set scores for outcome and conditions 
 Conditions Outcome 
Case Hyper-
Excitement 
Constitutional 
Dysfunction 
Adverse 
Instrument 
Choice 
Low 
Administrative 
Capacity 
Severe 
Blunder 
Berlin Airport 0.8 0.2 0.4 0.9 0.9 
TollCollect 0.6 0 0.8 0.4 0.2 
Elbphilharmonie, Hamburg 0.8 0 0.8 0.8 0.8 
Eurofighter 0.2 0.1 0.6 0.8 0.2 
Sydney Opera House 0.8 0.2 0.9 0.8 0.9 
Edinburgh Trams 0.6 0.1 0.8 0.9 0.9 
Scottish Parliament at Holyrood 0.9 0.2 0.9 0.8 0.8 
Big Dig, Boston 0.2 0.1 0.9 0.6 0.8 
'Big O' (Stadium for Montreal 1976 
Olympics) 0.9 0.2 0.9 0.8 0.9 
Olympic Games and Venues, 
London 2012 0.8 0.2 0.6 0.4 0.4 
Millennium Dome 0.9 0.8 0.6 0.6 0.8 
Concorde 0.4 0.1 0.8 0.4 0.2 
Channel Tunnel 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.1 
Bibliothèque nationale de France 0.9 0.4 0.8 0.2 0.4 
Australian Parliament 0.8 0.2 0.9 0.6 0.8 
Universal Credit 0.6 0.4 0.8 0.9 0.9 
WestCoast Rail Franchise 0.2 0.1 0.6 0.9 0.2 
Carrier Strike 0.6 0.8 0.6 0.9 0.6 
Transrapid 0.9 0.8 0.2 0.2 0.1 
Stuttgart 21 0.6 0.2 0.8 0.2 0.6 
Electronic Health Card (Germany) 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.1 0.2 
Identity Card Scheme (UK) 0.6 0.4 0.8 0.8 0.6 
Sochi 2014 Winter Olympics  0.9 0.8 0.4 0.2 0.4 
 
  
The calibration of fuzzy set scores is critical for the use of the fsQCA method, and we report 
further details of our coding evaluations in the Online Appendix. The scores emerged from 
independent evaluations of the cases by two co-authors that were subsequently moderated. 
While the exact initial scoring varied between the two authors, there was no inconsistency in 
the judgement as to whether particular values were above or below the 0.5 point.  
 
Table 4 summarizes this qualitative assessment of the weight of importance of each of these 
four conditions associated with blunders. Some conditions are more recurrent than others. 
From inspection of the average membership score for each condition we see that 
constitutional politics lags behind substantially (at 0.3), compared with instrument choice 
(0.7), hyper-excited politics (0.6) and administrative capacity (0.6).  
 
Necessary conditions for severe policy blunders 
Computational analysis was performed using the QCA 2.5 (Dusa 2007) packages for R 
deploying standard analysis procedures (see Thiem and Dusa 2013). Table 5(a) and (b) report 
the analysis of necessary conditions for the outcome of a severe policy blunder and not severe 
blunder respectively, for each of our four conditions and the negation (~) of that condition. 
Necessity analysis for logical disjunctions is reported in the online appendix (Tables A6 and 
A7). ‘Consistency’ indicates whether or not a particular combination of conditions is a 
consistent subset or superset of the outcome; this is ‘the degree to which cases sharing a given 
combination of conditions agree in displaying the outcome in question’ (Ragin 2008, p. 44). 
For example, if 15 out of 20 blunders share the combination of constitutional dysfunction and 
adverse instrument choice and also display the outcome of a severe blunder the consistency 
score for that conjunction would be equal to 0.75. Consistency is loosely analogous with a p-
value in conventional statistics. 
 
Analytically, it makes sense to consult other parameters of fit for conditions only when 
consistency thresholds are satisfied. ‘Coverage’ indicates the proportion of the outcome that 
  
can be explained by this combination of conditions; and thus indicates the empirical relevance 
of a particular condition or combination of conditions. Relevance of necessity is a measure 
which provides assurances against the triviality of a necessary condition. We use a threshold 
of a 0.90 consistency score for accepting a condition as necessary. As can be seen in Table 
5(a), most consistency scores are below 0.90, with the exception of that for instrument choice. 
We can therefore say that an adverse instrument choice alone is almost always a necessary 
condition for a severe policy blunder, though some other conditions (e.g. hyper-excitement, 
low administrative capacity, negation of constitutional dysfunction) are near the 0.90 
threshold. Table 5(b) reveals that no single condition is a necessary condition for the outcome 
of a not-severe blunder, with all consistency scores below 0.90.  
 
Table 5(a): Necessary conditions for the outcome of a severe blunder 
Condition tested Consistency Coverage Relevance of 
Necessity 
Hyper-excitement (H)  0.890 0.785 0.735 
Constitutional dysfunction (C)  0.417 0.803 0.927 
Adverse Instrument choice (I)  0.929 0.766 0.679 
Low Administrative capacity (A)  0.866 0.809 0.783 
~Hyper-excitement (~H)  0.433 0.640 0.823 
~Constitutional dysfunction (~C)  0.858 0.665 0.545 
 ~Adverse Instrument choice (~I)  0.402 0.671 0.860 
~Low Administrative capacity 
(~A) 
 0.433 0.585 0.777 
 
  
  
Table 5(b): Necessary conditions for the outcome of a not severe blunder 
Condition tested Consistency Coverage Relevance of 
Necessity 
Hyper-excitement (H)  0.699 0.500 0.544 
Constitutional dysfunction (C)  0.466 0.727 0.901 
Adverse Instrument choice (I)  0.757 0.506 0.500 
Low Administrative capacity (A)  0.621 0.471 0.566 
~Hyper-excitement (~H)  0.699 0.837 0.911 
~Constitutional dysfunction (~C)  0.874 0.549 0.471 
 ~Adverse Instrument choice (~I)  0.650 0.882 0.945 
~Low Administrative capacity 
(~A) 
 0.748 0.819 0.889 
 
 
Sufficient conditions for severe policy blunders 
Our analyses of sufficient conditions for the outcome of a severe policy blunder are reported 
in Table 6, while truth tables are reported in the online appendix (Tables A2 and A3). Table 6 
describes those subsets of conditions that are sufficient for occurrence of a policy blunder. For 
the ‘conservative’ solution, no assumptions are made about truth table rows where there are 
no empirical examples (logically possible combinations of conditions that are not reflected in 
our cases). We can see that the subset for the first solution – the presence of hyper-
excitement, low administrative capacity and the negation of constitutional dysfunction 
(H*~C*A) exceeds the 0.90 threshold of consistency – as does that for the second solution – 
that is, the combination of hyper-excitement, adverse instrument choice and low 
administrative capacity (H*I*A). Both these combinations provide over 0.70 coverage of 
membership in the outcome, indicating that the presence of these conditions are significantly 
and substantially associated with severe policy blunders. 
 
  
Table 6: Sufficient conditions for the outcome of a severe blunder (conservative solution) 
Solution H*~C*A H*I*A 
Single case (blunder) 
coverage 
Berlin Airport, Elbe, Sydney Opera 
House, Holyrood, Big O, Edinburgh 
Trams, Australian Parliament, Universal 
Credit, Identity Card Scheme 
Elbe, Sydney Opera House, 
Holyrood, Big O, Edinburgh 
Trams, Millennium Dome, 
Australian Parliament, Universal 
Credit, Carrier Strike, Identity 
Card Scheme 
Consistency 0.938 0.950 
Raw coverage 0.717 0.748 
Unique coverage 0.031 0.062 
Solution consistency 0.943 
Solution coverage 0.780 
Note: The consistency threshold has been set at 0.95. The next highest consistency score is 0.82. ‘~’ indicates 
negation of condition. 
 
The conservative solution therefore suggests two possible pathways to severe blunders, which 
can be better understood via selected cases. The Scottish Parliament at Holyrood provides a 
good illustration of the conjunction of hyper-excitement, low administrative capacity and the 
negation of constitutional dysfunction (H*~C*A). In this case, political desire to accelerate 
the project (to ensure the irreversibility of Scottish devolution) led to an under-estimation of 
costs and project risks. At the same time, fast-tracking of the procurement process and use of 
a private finance initiative left the project open to risk (Audit Scotland 2004; Fraser 2004). 
The cost of the project was further increased by changes in the design by the client. It was 
these conditions, not the newly established system of devolved government in Scotland, that 
led to the large cost overrun and delay on the project.  
 
The UK’s Millennium Dome offers a good example of the conjunction of hyper-excitement, 
adverse instrument choice and low administrative capacity (H*I*A). Here, the decision to 
proceed with the project by the newly elected Labour government in 1997 was a product of 
high politics, with Prime Minister Tony Blair overriding opposition in cabinet. Additionally, 
the attempt to finance the project on a private basis, via commercial revenues, led to reliance 
  
on ticket sales and sponsorship – with over-optimistic projections and problems in delivering 
the project contributing to financial difficulties experienced in 2000. In this particular case, 
the lack of checks and balances in the Westminster system that enabled hyper-politicization 
(H) is consistent with constitutional dysfunction (C), but is not a feature shared across other 
cases combining the three conditions (H*I*A). 
 
It is also possible to consider the ‘parsimonious’ solution. This permits use of counterfactuals 
not observed in the data, but that are mathematically possible. The parsimonious solution is 
reported in Table 7 and reveals that the solution of hyper-excitement plus low administrative 
capacity (H*A) is a sufficient condition with 0.94 consistency and 0.78 coverage. This would 
indicate that a substantial proportion of our cases of severe policy blunders exhibit these two 
core conditions. This particular simplifying assumption may be somewhat difficult to make 
theoretically as it would require acceptance that adverse instrument choice also displays the 
outcome in the counterfactual, which logically contradicts the statement that adverse 
instrument choice is necessary for a severe blunder. 
 
Table 7: Sufficient conditions for the outcome of a severe blunder (parsimonious solution) 
Solution H*A 
Single case (blunder) 
coverage 
Elbe, Sydney Opera House, Holyrood, 
Big O, Edinburgh Trams, Millennium 
Dome, Australian Parliament, Universal 
Credit, Carrier Strike, Identity Card 
Scheme 
Consistency 0.943 
Raw coverage 0.780 
Unique coverage 0.780 
Solution consistency 0.943 
Solution coverage 0.780 
Note: The consistency threshold has been set at 0.95. The next highest consistency score is 0.82. 
 
 
 
  
Table 8: Sufficient conditions for not severe blunders (conservative solution) 
Solution ~C*I*~A ~H*~C*~A H*C*~I*~A 
Single case (blunder) 
coverage 
Concorde, TollCollect, 
London 2012, 
Bibliothèque National de 
France, Stuttgart21 
Channel Tunnel, 
Electronic Health Card 
(Germany), Concorde 
Transrapid, Sochi 
2014 
Consistency 0.853 0.945 0.951 
Raw coverage 0.563 0.505 0.379 
Unique coverage 0.107 0.087 0.097 
Solution consistency 0.865 
Solution coverage 0.748 
 
 
Table 9: Sufficient conditions for not severe blunders (parsimonious solution) 
Solution ~A 
Single case (blunder) 
coverage 
Concorde, TollCollect, London 2012, 
Bibliothèque National de France, 
Stuttgart21, Channel Tunnel, Electronic 
Health Card (Germany), Transrapid, 
Sochi 2014 
Consistency 0.819 
Raw coverage 0.748 
 
It is also possible to consider sufficient conditions for the outcome of non-severe blunders. 
For not severe blunders the most conservative solution, reported in Table 8, describing only 
what is empirically observed can be summarized as ~A(~C*I + ~H*~C + H*C*~I). A high 
administrative capacity (~A) is a necessary part of all possible sufficient conjunctions for the 
outcome. In fact, assumptions on logical remainders allow the reduction of the solution to this 
single term suggesting it is possible that high administrative capacity alone is sufficient for 
the blunder to avoid severe and catastrophic outcomes, as shown by the parsimonious solution 
in Table 9. 
 
 
 
 
  
Discussion 
 
The summary of features of the individual cases combined with the fuzzy set analysis offers 
insights into the conditions associated with government blunders. First and foremost, 
constitutional features do not alone explain why policy blunders occur. Accusations of limited 
political oversight emerge across all political systems. The recurring problem across our cases 
was general deficiency of government in monitoring the performance of those responsible for 
the delivery of major public policies and projects – unrelated to constitutional politics. Indeed, 
things tend to go wrong mostly due to combined complexities of policy-making and project 
management, rather than simply because constitutional systems give rise to a lack of political 
interest or scrutiny.  
 
Similarly, blunders do not result just from hyper-excitement: politicians might prefer to 
engage in funding promises, legislative initiatives or regulatory knee-jerks. However, when it 
comes to long-term projects, such as the kind of cases that are of interest in this study, hyper-
excitement is typically linked to an appetite for making symbolic legacy commitments, 
presenting high-end technological fixes, and constructing iconic monuments, which 
encourages over-optimistic statements regarding their viability and limited cost implications. 
This, in turn, sets the stage for a reluctance to reverse decisions and abandon projects. The 
analysis shows that where administration is not resilient to the overreaches created by adverse 
instrument choices in hyper-excited politics, policy blunders will have more acute 
consequences. Previous studies have identified severe symptomatic impacts at the system-
level as causes, whereas cross-case analysis reveals that the politics implied by constitutional 
variance is not relevant to explaining the occurrence of major policy disasters. 
 
In sum, it is a combination of factors that accounts for blunders. The combination of hyper-
exited politics and administrative capacities explains a large number of our cases - and these 
range from the construction of prestigious buildings to defense and other industrial politics-
  
related projects to large-scale technological programmes for welfare policy. Combined with 
these core conditions, it is the negation of constitutional politics or the inclusion of instrument 
choice that explain severe policy blunders. As noted, the adverse choice of instrument was 
found to be an almost always necessary condition for severe blunders. The explanation for the 
negation of severe blunders suggests that blundering is ameliorated by high administrative 
capacity in combination with other conditions (e.g. the absence of constitutional dysfunction 
and adverse instrument selection).  
 
Conclusion 
This study has concentrated on the factors associated with major government blunders. This 
approach is generalizable to the study of policy blunders across a wider set of domains and 
jurisdictions, and similarly it can be extended to the study of the conditions associated with 
policy ‘success’ (i.e. ‘what works’) (Bovens et al. 2001; McConnell 2010). Our study featured 
projects that shared one common feature, namely a high reversal cost. This reversal cost could 
either be seen in terms of project abandonment or in terms of political cost. Such a common 
feature may contrast our study with other episodes of blundering, for example, ill-coordinated 
responses after natural disasters or lack of responsiveness to institutional abuse of vulnerable 
individuals.  
 
Nevertheless, some broader insights emerge from our analysis. One is that constitutional 
features do not seem to matter when it comes to severe government blunders, at least not in 
the ways emphasized by the single country literature. That is, different constitutional systems 
resorted to similar highly complex technical fixes, they were attracted to mega-events, and 
they were prone to cost and time overruns. These phenomena also emerged at different points 
in time. This suggests that the widespread criticism regarding the US and British political 
systems (or any other) in terms of being blunder-prone requires further consideration.  It also 
calls for a reconsideration of those claims that have suggested a recent rise in blunders due to 
  
cutbacks or public service reforms. Therefore, this study also has potential implications for 
the study of policy success and failure more generally (Marsh and McConnell 2010; Bovens 
and ‘t Hart 2016). One possible application would be to start the analysis for a pre-registered 
sample of policies and projects at a t=0 and continuously take ‘temperature readings’ as to the 
degree of success or failure and the presence or absence of conditions. 
 
A further insight is that our study pointed to elements of hyper-excited politics in that systems 
were open to the temptation of engaging in iconic and legacy politics. Blunder as a result of 
initial reputational or prestige-seeking policy choices features across political systems. In 
addition, those projects that reflect particularly prominent 'solutions hunting for problems' 
seem open to policy blunders, as solutions reflect the end rather than the means in policy-
making. However, we do not find that particular instruments are prone to failures, as we 
observe different organizational forms, with both state and industry-led projects in our 
sample.  
 
In other words, blundering is not an inherently system-specific feature, but one that occurs 
across political systems. This suggests an element of active choice or agency. This agency is, 
in turn, met by the inherent limits of administration whose capacities are outgunned by 
complexities and ambiguities inherent in the kind of projects and policies discussed in this 
paper. Blaming national characteristics for blunders and failures may therefore offer support 
to calls for constitutional reform, whittling down of the state and outsourcing of its functions, 
and further denude politicians at the same time as absolving them from making choices. 
However, our cross-national study suggests that such an argument makes for poor and 
unsupported empirical analysis.  
  
References 
Audit Scotland. (2004). Management of the Holyrood building project. Edinburgh: Audit Scotland. 
Bovens, Mark, and Paul ‘t Hart. (1996). Understanding Policy Fiascos. London: Transaction. 
Bovens, Mark, and Paul ‘t Hart. (2016). ‘Revisiting the Study of Policy Failures.’ Journal of 
European Public Policy 23(5): 653-666. 
Bovens, Mark, Paul ‘t Hart, and B. Guy Peters (Eds.) (2001). Success and Failure in Public 
Governance: A Comparative Analysis. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
Breyer, Stephen. (1993). Breaking the Vicious Circle. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Cohen, Stanley. (1972). Folk Devils and Moral Panics. London: Paladin.  
COJO ’76. (1978). The Official Report of the Games of the XXIst Olympiad Montréal 1976. Montreal: 
COJO ’76. 
Crozier, Michel. (1971) La Société bloquée. Paris: Editions du Seuil.   
Dion, Douglas. (1998). ‘Evidence and Inference in the Comparative Case Study.’ Comparative 
Politics 30(2): 127-145. 
Dunleavy, Patrick. (1995). ‘Policy Disasters’ Public Policy and Administration 10(2): 52-70. 
Dunleavy, Patrick, Helen Margetts, Simon Bastow, and Jane Tinkler. (2006) ‘New Public 
Management is Dead, Long live Digital-Era Governance.’ Journal of Public Administration 
Research and Theory 16(3): 467-94. 
Dusa, Adrian. (2007). ‘User manual for the QCA (GUI)  package in R.’ Journal of Business Research 
60(5): 576-586. 
Finer, Samuel. (1975) Adversary Politics and Electoral Reform. London: Anthony Wigram. 
Fitchett, Joseph. (1995). ‘New Paris Library: Visionary or Outdated?’ The New York Times, March 30, 
1995. 
Flyvbjerg, Bent, Nils Bruzelius, and Werner Rothengatter. (2003). Megaprojects and Risk. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Fraser, Rt Hon Lord of Carmyllie. (2004). The Holyrood Inquiry. Edinburgh: Scottish Parliament. 
  
Gray, Pat (1996). ‘Disastrous Explanations -- or Explanations of Disaster? A Reply to Patrick 
Dunleavy.’ Public Policy & Administration 11(1): 74-82. 
Gray, Pat and Paul 't Hart. (1998). Public Policy Disasters in Western Europe. London: Routledge. 
Hacker, Jacob and Paul Pierson. (2010). Winner-Taks-All-Politics. New York: Simon & Schuster. 
Hall, Peter. (1980). Great Planning Disasters. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson. 
Hille, Kathrin. (2014). ‘Putin gambles all on creation myth behind Sochi.’ The Financial Times, 
February 6, 2014. 
Hood, Christopher; Jennings, Will and Paul Copeland. (2016). ‘Blame avoidance in comparative 
perspective.’ Public Administration 94(2): 542-62. 
Hood, Christopher and Margetts, Helen. (2007). Tools of Government in the Digital Age. Basingstoke: 
Palgrave. 
Jennings, Will. (2012). Olympic Risks. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Jones, Bryan and Baumgartner, Frank. (2005). The Politics of Attention. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press. 
Kahnemann, Daniel. (2013). Thinking, Fast and Slow. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux. 
King, Anthony and Crewe, Ivor. (2013). The Blunders of Our Governments. London: Oneworld 
Publishing. 
King, Gary, Keohane, Robert, and Verba, Sidney. (1994). Designing Social Inquiry. Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press. 
Lodge, Martin and Hood, Christopher. (2002). ‘Pavlovian Policy Responses to Media Feeding 
Frenzies?’ Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management 10(1): 1-13. 
Light, Paul. (2016). ‘Vision + Action = Faithful Execution: Why Government Daydreams and How to 
Stop the Cascade of Breakdowns That Now Haunts It.’ PS: Political Science & Policy 49(1): 5-
20. 
Marsh, David, and Allan McConnell. (2010). ‘Towards a Framework for Establishing Policy Success.’ 
Public Administration 88(2): 564-583. 
McConnell, Allan. (2010). Understanding Policy Success: Rethinking Public Policy. Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan. 
  
McConnell, Allan. (2016). ‘A public policy approach to understanding the nature and causes of 
foreign policy failure.’ Journal of European Public Policy 23(5): 667-684. 
Medzihorsky, Juraj, Ioana-Elena Oana, Mario Quaranta and Carsten Q. Schneider. (2016). 
SetMethods: Functions for Set-Theoretic Multi-Method Research and Advanced QCA. R package 
version 2.0.  
Moran, Michael. (2001). ‘Not steering but drowning.’ Political Quarterly 72: 414-427. 
National Audit Office. (2000). The Millennium Dome. London: The Stationery Office. 
National Audit Office. (2012). Lessons from cancelling the InterCity West Coast franchise 
competition. London: The Stationery Office. 
National Audit Office. (2013). Universal Credit: early progress. London: The Stationery Office. 
Pressman, Jeffery and Aaron Wildavsky (1973).  Implementation. Berkeley: University of California 
Press.   
Ragin, Charles. (2000). Fuzzy-Set Social Science. Chicago: Chicago University Press. 
Ragin, Charles. (2008). Redesigning Social Inquiry: Fuzzy Sets and Beyond. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press. 
Ragin, Charles. (2009). ‘Qualitative Comparative Analysis using Fuzzy Sets (fsQCA).’ In Benoît 
Rihoux and Charles Ragin (eds.) Configurational Comparative Methods: Qualitative 
Comparative Analysis (QCA) and Related Techniques. Los Angeles: Sage, pp. 87-122. 
Resodihardjo, Sandra; Carroll, Brendan; van Eijk, Carola and Sanne Maris (2016). ‘Why traditional 
responses to blame games fail.’ Public Administration 94(2): 350-63. 
Scharpf, Fritz W. (1988). ‘The Joint Decision Trap.’ Public Administration 66(3): 239-278. 
Schuck, Peter H. (2015). Why Government Fails So Often. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Schneider, Carsten, and Claudius Wagemann. (2012). Set-Theoretic Methods for the Social Sciences. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Science and Technology Committee. (2006). Identity Card Technologies: Scientific Advice, Risk and 
Evidence. London: The Stationery Office Limited. 
Thiem, Alrik and Adrian Dusa (2013) Qualitative Comparative Analysis with R: A User’s Guide, 
London: Springer. 
  
Transport Select Committee. (2013). Cancellation of the InterCity West Coast franchise competition. 
London: The Stationery Office Limited. 
Tsebelis, George. (2002). Veto Players. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Weaver, R. Kent and Rockman, Bert. (1993). Do Institutions Matter? Washington, DC: Brookings. 
Wilson, Woodrow. (1887). ‘The Study of Administration.’ Political Science Quarterly 2(1): 197-222. 
W. Jennings, M. Lodge and M. Ryan ‘Comparing Blunders in Government’ 
 
APPENDIX  
 
Table A1: Qualitative Comparative Analysis of Twenty-Three Policy Blunders 
Case Problem Hyper-Excited Politics Constitutional Politics Instrument Choice Administrative Capacity 
Berlin Brandenburg 
Airport 
Severity = 0.9 
Long-term delay in opening of 
new airport, technical problems 
with the structure relating to health 
and safety. High visibility, high 
cost/time overruns. 
Total cost of €5.4bn (estimated), 
escalated from an initial €2.9bn. 
Wider context at the outset. 
Initial enthusiasm in context of 
unification and subsequent 
move of capital.  
Need to maintain ‘low cost’ said 
to lead to under-capacity airport 
with high complexity 
technology. 
[0.8] 
Mixed project involving two Land 
governments and federal government, 
leading to accusation of responsibility 
diffusion; constitutional and 
administrative court reviews. 
 
 
[0.2] 
Highly constrained due to EU 
provisions. The initial choice of a 
private consortium, led by 
Hochtief, to construct the airport 
was overruled by a court ruling. 
This was outside the control of 
policy-makers and led various 
governments to take on 
responsibility for the project. 
[0.4] 
Questions about lack of oversight 
over project.  
Delivery capacity also limited as no 
overall oversight 
 
 
[0.9] 
Toll Collect, Germany 
Severity = 0.2 
Delay in introduction of scheme in 
the early 2000s, accusation that 
private providers didn’t inform 
federal government regarding 
initial problems. Tribunal into this 
continues until the present day. 
Consortium has been renewed 
until 2018; fails to shape traffic 
flows and technical option has not 
been exported. 
Court battle over €7.5bn 
Initially seen as advancing 
German competitiveness and 
industry as well as ‘model’ for 
public private partnerships – 
signing shortly before 2002 
election was to be ‘success’ and 
promise of extra-income; claim 
that without projected income 
Germany might violate 
Maastricht criteria. 
[0.6] 
No 
 
 
 
 
 
[0] 
Private consortium 
allocation/contractual relations 
seen as highly problematic and 
lead to continuous legal 
challenges.  
First round had failed initially. 
 
 
[0.8]  
Accusation that deal favours private 
consortium; internal criticism 
overruled by minister; need to 
deliver ‘contract’ means no 
enforcement powers over private 
consortium. 
 
 
[0.4] 
Elbe Philharmonie, 
Germany 
Severity = 0.8 
Considerable delay and overspend 
of concert hall building in 
Hamburg – initial plan to spend 
€3.5m for internal ‘skin’ – only 
provider charges €31m – then 
Hamburg searches on its own 
€15m, state insurances firm 
against bankruptcy; €44m cost 
overrun. 
Initial estimate €241m; current 
estimate €789. 
Prestige building in previously 
declining part of the city. 
 
 
 
 
[0.8] 
No 
 
 
 
 
 
[0] 
Initial promise that building 
wouldn’t cost anything apart from 
‘donation’ of the land plus 
allowing hotel/flats (40m) – 
donations made €68.3m. Adoption 
of initial proposal without any 
competition and use of initial 
architects for project planning. 
Company bids with too low price 
to win contract 
[0.8] 
Rege (loco) loses control over 
process, gets overwhelmed by 
changes by architect. 
 
 
 
 
[0.8] 
Eurofighter 
Severity = 0.2 
Delayed project with ongoing 
technical problems, cost overruns 
(estimate €16.8bn instead of 
€14.7bn - initially 130m per plane, 
by 1997: 180 planes for €11.8bn) 
and doubled per/hour flying cost 
(€80k); initial plans: 1988 with 
first flight 1997 - first flight 2006. 
No. More a product of close 
relationship between politics 
and military-industrial complex 
(in late 1980s Bavaria part-
owner of manufacturer). 
 
[0.2] 
No 
(European wide construction/ conflict 
with UK/France and ongoing 
politics/corruption allegation over 
deals/failure of deals. demands by UK 
(capture by Rolls Royce) add 
complexity and further cost driver) 
[0.1] 
No 
 
 
 
 
[0.6] 
Lack of expert oversight in 
manufacturer to control quality - 
problems are found by safety 
regulator. 
Closeness of Ministry of Defence to 
industry. 
 
[0.8] 
Sydney Opera House 
(1955-1973) 
Severity = 0.9 
Massively over-budget (cost 
overrun of 1,400%); completed ten 
years later than originally planned. 
Support for the project from 
NSW Government and Premier. 
Keenness to get project started 
meant that construction started 
while designs were still being 
drawn up. 
 
 
[0.8] 
No. Project led by state government 
(NSW Government) and financed 
through a state lottery. 
 
 
 
 
[0.2] 
Design competition (1955-1957). 
Private project construction firm 
Civil & Civic and engineers Ove 
Arup and Partners. Technical 
difficulties in the construction of 
the iconic ‘shells’ of the Opera 
House roof (the geometry was not 
defined in Utzon’s original 
designs). 
[0.9] 
A breakdown in relations between 
the architect, Jørn Utzon, and the 
NSW government led him to resign 
from the project – forced out by 
Minister for Public Works, Davis 
Hughes (a situation Utzon described 
as ‘Malice in Blunderland’). Utzon 
was replaced – with the upheaval 
affecting the design of the building, 
costs and time for completion. 
[0.8] 
Edinburgh Trams project 
(2003-2014) 
Severity = 0.9 
Originally costed at £375 million 
(2003), estimated final cost over 
£1 billion (cost overrun of almost 
300%).  
Completion dates slipped from 
2011 to 2014 (three years). 
2/3rd of planned lines built 
City Council was intent on 
construction of a tram network 
(also fitted with climate change 
agenda). 
 
 
 
[0.6] 
No. Project initiated by the Labour-led 
Scottish Executive in 2003 (devolved 
government).  
SNP minority government tried to 
scrap the project after it was elected in 
2007, but was blocked by the other 
parties. 
 
[0.1] 
Utility diversion work proved to 
be more complex than originally 
anticipated. Changes were made to 
the planned route. Edinburgh city 
centre was left gridlocked by 
“catastrophic failure” of traffic 
management. 
 
[0.8] 
Major dispute between Transport 
Initiatives Edinburgh (TIE), the 
arms-length company (owned by the 
City of Edinburgh Council) 
responsible and its main contractor 
(Bilfinger Berger). Lack of 
experience or skills on board of TIE 
to oversee the Tram project. 
Company was eventually scrapped. 
A judge-led inquiry into the fiasco 
was launched in 2014. 
[0.9] 
Scottish Parliament at 
Holyrood (1997-2004) 
Severity = 0.8 
Cost overrun of 1,000%, 
completed three years late. 
Political desire to fast track the 
project. Experience in 1970s of 
halted devolution led to ‘lock-
in’ of the project. Symbolic 
importance of new parliament 
led to preference for ‘quality 
over cost’ in planning. Rush to 
deliver the project led to an 
under-estimation of risk. Over-
optimistic estimation of the cost 
on incomplete information. 
[0.9] 
Newly established system of devolved 
government in Scotland.  
 
 
 
 
 
[0.2] 
Publicly financed, contractors 
secured through tendering process, 
a joint venture between EMBT 
and RMJM Ltd. 
Fast-tracking procurement, instead 
of PFI, left project open to risk. 
 
 
[0.9] 
Procurement process led the project 
to ‘cost what it cost’. 
Major changes in the client 
requirement for the area and layout 
of parts of the building. 
 
 
 
[0.8] 
Boston’s Big Dig (1982-
2007) 
Severity = 0.8 
Cost overrun of 500%, completion 
date slipped from 1998 to 2007 
(nine years late). Problems with 
construction standards, safety and 
fraud by contractors. 
Limited political intervention in 
the project. Presidential veto in 
1982, but appropriation given 
Congressional approval soon 
after. 
 
 
 
[0.2] 
Federal funding of construction works, 
delivered through a partnership 
between the Massachusetts Turnpike 
Authority and private programme 
manager Bechtel/Parsons Brinckerhoff. 
 
 
[0.1] 
Once decision was taken to build a 
subterranean highway (central 
artery/tunnel) for Boston’s road 
infrastructure system, the project 
was irreversible. The Big Dig was 
a highly technically challenging 
infrastructure project. Problems 
with the tunnel such as leaks and 
structural fissures.  
[0.9] 
Discovered that leaks were due to 
poor construction standards by 
contractors. Legal dispute with the 
contractors over the construction 
quality, cost overruns and safety 
violations (led to payout of around 
$450 million). 
 
[0.6] 
Olympic Stadium, 
Montreal (1970-1976) 
Severity = 0.9 
Cost overrun of 1,250%; problems 
with completion; labour disputes 
disrupted progress of the project; 
inflation of the cost of building 
materials.  
Strong lobbying for the project 
from Jean Drapeau, Mayor of 
Montreal, renowned for 
ambitious projects by the City. 
Over-confidence that event 
would be self-financing.  
 
 
[0.9] 
Olympic projects were overseen by the 
Montreal City Government and Private 
Bid Corporation. ‘Self-financing 
model’ under the Organizing 
Committee for the Olympic Games 
(COJO ’76), but with financial 
guarantees from the City of Montreal. 
 
[0.2] 
Choice of complex designs for the 
venues (stadium-pool-velodrome 
complex) and use of pioneering 
construction techniques were a 
factor in delays and cost overruns. 
Project also suffered from scope 
creep of technical specification. 
 
[0.9] 
Changes in technical specification of 
Velodrome (due to subsoil), 
commodity price inflation and 
general price shocks. 
Failure to identify unstable sub-soil 
(missed by geological surveys). 
Under-estimation of the cost of 
materials/labour costs (inflation) and 
danger of work stoppages. 
[0.8] 
Olympic Games and 
Venues, London (2003-
12) 
Severity = 0.4 
Cost overrun of 290% on the 
overall budget; cost overrun of c. 
200%% on the Olympic Stadium 
(from £280 million to £547 
million), and 400% on the 
Aquatics Centre (from £75 million 
to £313 million). Bailouts needed 
for commercial development of 
the Olympic Village and Media 
Centre, and shortage of security 
personnel. 
Cross-party support for 
London’s bid, but received 
support both of Tony Blair and 
London mayor Ken Livingstone 
in final lobbying of the IOC 
membership. 
 
[0.8] 
Olympic Organizing Committee 
financed through commercial 
activities. Financing of infrastructure 
by government, to be delivered by 
private consortia. Government as 
‘backer of last resort’ for all Olympic 
projects. 
 
[0.2] 
Shortfalls in private financing of 
both the Olympic Village and 
infrastructure for the Olympic park 
due to the global financial crisis 
(investors returned after the 
downturn had eased). 
 
[0.6] 
Omission of predictable costs from 
the original estimates, and simple 
flaws such as exclusion of VAT and 
security costs led to growth of the 
budget. Growth of the budget also 
resulted from the addition of a large 
programme contingency (£2.2 
billion).  
[0.4] 
Millennium Dome 
(1992-2001) 
Severity = 0.8 
Cost overrun of just 4% on the 
project, but 57% increase in public 
cost; major political fiasco 
(Opening Night left journalists and 
VIPs waiting in the cold for hours 
at Stratford station - ‘could not 
have gone worse without loss of 
life’); difficulty in finding a 
commercial buyer for the venue; 
highly negative media coverage. 
Tony Blair considered it the 
‘first paragraph’ of his re-
election manifesto, overriding 
majority of opposition from 
Cabinet. 
 
 
 
[0.9] 
Decision taken in Cabinet at instigation 
of the Prime Minister (Deputy Prime 
Minister ensured Cabinet backing). 
Transition between Major and Labour 
governments caused problems with 
project development (created high 
level of uncertainty in developing 
plans for millennium exhibition). 
[0.8] 
The New Millennium Experience 
Company (NMEC), financed 
through Millennium Commission 
grants and commercial revenues 
from ticket sales and sponsors. 
 
 
 
[0.6] 
Shortfalls against expected revenue 
from ticket sales and sponsorship. 
Additional grants from the 
Millennium Commission to keep the 
project afloat exceeded the cost of 
cancellation. 
 
 
[0.6] 
Concorde (1962-1976) 
Severity = 0.2 
Cost overrun of 1,100%. Symbolic concerns of British 
and French governments over 
demonstrating technological and 
engineering prowess. 
 
 
 
 
[0.4] 
Operated under the terms of an 
international treaty between the French 
and British Governments (rather than a 
contract between the companies), 
penalties for cancellation of the 
project.  
 
 
 
[0.1] 
Joint venture between private 
companies, British Aircraft 
Corporation (BAC) and 
Aérospatiale. 
Order cancellations due to a range 
of factors, in particular the effects 
of the 1973 oil crisis on the civil 
aviation industry, financial 
difficulties of airlines, 
environmental concerns and air 
show crash of the Soviet 
competitor aircraft. 
[0.8] 
Cost of cancellation cheaper than 
continuing with project known to be 
uneconomic (some uncertainty over 
legal liability according to the treaty 
between the countries). 
 
 
 
[0.4] 
Channel Tunnel (1981-
1994) 
Severity = 0.1 
Cost overrun of 80%; completed 
one year late. 
British Government not 
interested in funding the project. 
Supported private leadership of 
it. 
[0.2] 
No. 
 
[0.1] 
Privately financed venture, 
delivered on a ‘BOOT’ basis 
(build-own-operate-transfer). 
[0.1] 
Changes to the technical 
specification of the project in 
relation to environmental factors, 
safety and security. 
[0.4] 
Bibliothèque nationale de 
France 
Severity = 0.4 
Project hit by cost overruns and 
technical difficulties with its high 
rise design. 
Cost approaching $2 billion 
Project announced on 14 July 
1988, by President François 
Mitterrand. Large, ambitious 
project. One of the ‘Grand 
Projets’ of Francois Mitterand – 
programme to create modern 
monuments in Paris. Socialist 
government’s agenda focused 
on cultural politics/production. 
(Personally inspected materials 
used for the Louvre Pyramid). 
Crash contract so no new 
president could alter plans. 
[0.9] 
Presidential influence over the project 
a factor. Projects under the Ministry of 
Culture, overseen by a senior official 
Emile Biasini. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[0.4] 
Ambitious, technical designs using 
high quality materials. High rise 
design proved problematic. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[0.8] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[0.2] 
Australian Parliament 
House (1978-1988) 
Severity = 0.8 
Original cost of the project was 
A$151 million (in 1978 prices), 
was quickly revised up to A$220 
million in 1980, with the actual 
final cost rising to $1.1 billion. 
Supposed to be completed by 26 
January 1988 (the bicentenary of 
European settlement of Australia) 
but finally opened 9 May 1998. 
New Parliament building 
conceived as a national symbol, 
coinciding with bicentennial 
celebrations. Decision was taken 
to ‘fast track’ the project, 
commencing construction before 
designs were finalized, in order 
to meet the opening date. 
“Many of the difficulties arose 
from the fast track system which 
the Authority adopted to try to 
meet the target data for 
completion” (Auditor-General 
1987). 
[0.8] 
Direct accountability of the Parliament 
House Construction Authority (PHCA) 
to Parliament and Cabinet via the 
Minister for the Capital Territory. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[0.2] 
Early decision that the structure 
should be conventional (i.e. did 
not use pioneering technology). 
Project to be delivered through 
Parliament House Construction 
Authority (PHCA) as government 
body with overall responsibility. 
Scope creep in the technical 
specification; changes to user 
requirements were a major factor 
in cost overruns. 
 
 
[0.9] 
Omission of a contingency in the 
budget. Difficulties experienced in 
managing project architects (with 
designs often submitted late).Much 
of procurement relied upon a 
contractor managed a wide range of 
trade subcontracts. 
 
 
 
 
 
[0.6] 
Universal Credit (2010-) 
Severity = 0.9 
Originally due to launch nationally 
for new claimants in October 
2013, with aim of simplifying the 
system for working-age benefits. 
Universal Credit has been hit by 
delays and substantial write-offs of 
new IT systems. It was “reset” in 
early 2013 due to the Major 
Projects Authority raising serious 
concerns regarding programme 
implementation. Significant 
problems with the development of 
IT systems and processes led to 
delays in target date for national 
roll-out of the programme. 
Lack of clarity over whether the 
new IT systems will support the 
national roll-out, leading to an 
initial write-off of £34 million of 
new IT assets (NAO 2013, p. 7), 
and warnings that this figure may 
eventually increase. 
Universal Credit was one of the 
flagship reforms initiated under 
the Coalition Government, and 
launched at the Conservative 
Party conference in 2010. The 
scope of reforms and the 
timetables set were highly 
ambitious, reflecting the 
political importance of the 
policy. Universal Credit was the 
signature policy of Secretary of 
State for Work and Pensions, 
Iain Duncan Smith (sole holder 
of this portfolio between 2010 
and 2015).  
Also alleged that the Minister or 
his aides have briefed against 
the DWP permanent secretary 
(New Statesman, 11 April 
2014). 
“When setting up the 
programme the Department 
adopted an ambitious timetable 
for national roll-out from 
October 2013.” (NAO 2013, 
p.7). 
“The programme has been 
subject to high levels of 
ministerial and senior 
departmental engagement from 
the outset. Since October 2012, 
departmental ministers and the 
Permanent Secretary, met 
weekly to review progress.” 
(NAO 2013, p. 37). 
[0.6] 
The Welfare Reform Act delegated 
operational details of Universal Credit 
to statutory instruments. 
Legislative oversight of the project has 
been limited by a lack of cooperation 
from the Department of Work and 
Pensions in the provision of accurate, 
timely and detailed information.  
“Effective scrutiny by select 
committees relies on government 
departments providing them with 
accurate, timely and detailed 
information. This has not always 
happened to date in relation to our 
scrutiny of the problems with 
Universal Credit implementation.” 
(Work and Pensions Committee 2014, 
p. 25). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[0.4] 
Choice of a universal integrated 
system involved substantial scale 
and complexity. In development of 
the programme, discovered that 
some new IT systems were unable 
to be integrated with the new 
digital system for Universal 
Credit. 
Concerns raised that the new 
system is unable to handle changes 
in circumstances and complicated 
cases, so these will have to be 
processed manually.  
“Throughout the programme the 
Department has lacked a detailed 
view of how Universal Credit is 
meant to work.” (NAO 2013, p.8). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[0.8] 
The senior leadership of Universal 
Credit experienced a high rate of 
turnover, while more generally 
“lacked IT expertise” (NAO 2013, p. 
35). The DWP was criticized by the 
National Audit Office of having a 
“good news” reporting culture and 
operating under a “fortress 
mentality”. 
“Since mid-2012, the Department 
has experienced high turnover in the 
senior leadership of Universal 
Credit.... Including the reset and the 
current director general for 
Universal Credit, the programme 
has had five different senior 
responsible owners since mid-2012.” 
(NAO 2013, p. 9). 
“The Department ring-fenced the 
Universal Credit team and allowed it 
to work with a large degree of 
independence. Major Projects 
Authority and supplier-led reviews in 
mid-2012 identified a ‘fortress’ 
mentality within the programme 
team and a ‘good news’ reporting 
culture” (NAO 2013, p. 8). 
 
 
 
 
[0.9] 
Collapse of the West 
Coast Main Line rail 
franchise competition 
(2011-2014) 
Severity = 0.2 
Decision to award the West Coast 
Main Line rail franchise to 
FirstGroup scrapped by the 
government after “significant 
technical flaws” in the process of 
procurement.  
Failure of the franchise 
competition incurred £2.7 million 
in professional fees related to 
judicial review of the decision, in 
addition to £4.3 million in costs of 
reviews commissioned from 
external advisers. 
Estimated cost of reimbursing the 
four bidders around £40 million. 
Over-ambitious policy in view 
of departmental capacity and 
resources. Political haste by new 
government in introducing 
major reform to the franchising 
regime. 
The Transport Select Committee 
(TSC) noted “lessons for 
ministers in terms of more 
realistically matching policy 
ambition to departmental 
capacity and resources” (TSC 
2013, p. 3) 
"Embarking on an ambitious, 
perhaps unachievable, reform of 
franchising, in haste, on the 
UK’s most complex piece of 
railway was irresponsible and 
involved such an element of risk 
that greater senior executive 
oversight and relevant technical 
expertise was required. (pp.10-
11)  
[0.2] 
Institutional structures were in place 
for assurance, but little attention to 
procurement: “scant attention paid by 
the DfT’s board and executive 
committee to rail franchising” (TSC 
2013, p. 8). Failures due to internal 
processes/checks not having worked, 
not due constitutional design. 
"The discretionary adjustment of the 
figures, to the benefit of First Group, 
clearly opened the DfT to legal 
challenge from Virgin Trains. Officials 
and advisers knew that this risk existed 
but did not provide sufficient warning 
of it to senior civil servants and 
ministers. Indeed, misleading 
information, that the SLF figures had 
been derived from the model, was fed 
up the chain" (TSC 2013, p.7) 
 
 
[0.1] 
The invitation to tender for the 
franchise was issued before any 
decision was taken on how to 
calculate ‘subordinated loan 
facilities’ (SLF) (capital provided 
by the bidder’s parent company to 
guarantee operator losses and 
protect government against risk of 
default).  
The DfT had not developed a tool 
to calculate the SLF. Instead it 
used an internal model. Officials 
used discretion to adjust figures, to 
the advantage of First Group (over 
Virgin Trains). Modelling was 
flawed (was expressed in real 
terms, when it should have been 
expressed in nominal cash terms). 
 
 
[0.6] 
At £5.5 billion, “probably the 
biggest single contract DfT had ever 
attempted to award” (TSC 2013, p. 
7). 
Policy disaster attributed to failures 
of governance: “there were no senior 
staff directly involved with the 
procurement project, no one person 
clearly in charge, and a lack of 
senior oversight of the project team” 
(TSC 2013, p. 8). Project was given 
a green rating by the Major Projects 
Authority after a review of the 
franchise competition. 
DfT suffered from considerable 
turnover of senior staff, lack of 
management oversight and 
ownership of the franchise, internal 
governance of the project was 
confused (NAO 2012, p. 8). 
 
[0.9] 
Carrier Strike, UK 
(2007-2020) 
Severity = 0.6 
In 2007, the Ministry of Defence 
agreed a programme to deliver two 
aircraft carriers, completed in 
2016 and 2018 at a cost of £3.65 
billion. The decision of the newly 
elected Coalition Government in 
2010 to switch to a different sort 
of aircraft/carrier combination led 
to an increase in forecast costs of 
around £2 billion, resulting in a U-
turn. Switching back to the 
original aircraft type led to £74 
million being written-off, and a 
delay of when the carrier would be 
completed to 2020. 
Beyond this, there has been a total 
cost increase for Carrier Strike of 
£2.6 billion (NAO 2014, p. 13). 
Reversal of a decision by the 
previous government by the 
Coalition was part of defence 
cuts under its programme of 
austerity introduced hastily in 
2010. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[0.6] 
Change to policy by new government 
typical of claims regarding the 
adversarial nature of policy-making in 
the British system. Lack of checks and 
balances over the review of defence 
spending in 2010, combined with a 
lack of transparency and rushed 
process, was linked to mistakes in the 
decision-making process. However, the 
cost of the U-turn (£74 million) is 
dwarfed by the other cost increases on 
the project (£2.6 billion) due to 
technical factors. 
“The Department attributed these 
mistakes, which have cost taxpayers at 
least £74 million, to the process being 
rushed and secret.” (PASC 2013, p. 5). 
 
[0.8] 
In 2014, the NAO reported that 
“the cost increase on Carriers is 
largely driven by technical 
factors” (NAO 2014, p. 13). These 
included increases in labour, 
warehousing and storage costs due 
to delays in the air carriers 
entering service,  and scope creep 
across a range of aspects of the 
project, such as designs and 
material costs.  
“The Department admitted that 
while interoperability with the 
French and the Americans 
remains a priority, the ability to 
land the carrier variant aircraft on 
other nation’s aircraft carriers 
had proven to be more technically 
difficult than previously thought.” 
(PASC 2013, p. 8). 
[0.6] 
During the 2010 Strategic Defence 
and Security Review (SDSR) the 
option of switching to the carrier 
variant of the Joint Strike Fighter, 
and as a result had to generate cost 
estimates quickly on the basis of 
insufficient information (PASC 
2013, p. 7). By February 2012, the 
estimated cost of converting the 
aircraft carrier has risen from £500-
800 million to £2 billion. Under-
estimation of costs was “the result of 
omitting predictable costs, such as 
the costs of planning the conversion, 
and basic errors which included 
omitting VAT and inflation from the 
costs of converting the carriers” 
(PASC 2013, p. 8). 
 
[0.9] 
Transrapid, Germany 
Severity = 0.1 
Maglev technology has been tested 
since 1969, but was abandoned in 
2012, following failure to 
introduce it into German system; 
one operating system in China 
(Shanghai); costs difficult to 
determine: €700m by 1989; 
planned line Berlin - Hamburg 
increased to €7.5bn (others say 
10bn) - abandoned. Cost estimates 
3bn not 1.85bn for Munich airport 
link leads to abandonment. €800m 
from 1970-2012 for test track. 
Hyper-excited politics on 
various occasions, most 
famously Edmund Stoiber’s 
enthusiasm as Bavarian prime 
minister for service to airport 
(https://www.youtube.com/watc
h?v=f7TboWvVERU). 
Regularly championed as 
symbol of German industrial 
innovation - promotion of high 
tech for export. 
 
 
[0.9] 
Intergovernmental financing of the 
project leads ultimately to the 
abandonment of the project - earlier 
abandonment due to Deutsche Bahn 
criticism (unwillingness to carry 
operational risks). 
 
 
 
 
 
[0.8] 
Highly optimistic costings that are 
not updated to reflect rise in 
construction costs/compliance 
costs regarding environmental 
regulation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[0.2] 
Lack of understanding of cost 
reductions in air travel and 
technological potential in 
conventional rail travel. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[0.2] 
Stuttgart 21, Germany 
Severity = 0.6 
Ongoing railway station re-
construction leading to 
considerable political change - 
green/red coalition government in 
Land, change in mayor in 
Stuttgart. Public protests, public 
conciliation process and 
referendum - supports construction 
- cost estimate €6.5bn by 2012 
(estimate 2010: 4.5bn), campaigns 
in 2009 with 2004 figures: 3.1bn. 
First announcement: 1994. 
Not high - but supporters 
highlight that railway station 
and its redesign is essential for 
local/regional competitiveness. 
 
[0.6] 
Intergovernmental politics despite 
railways being a ‘federal’ matter.  
 
 
[0.2] 
None - conflict over plans and 
early construction, not overall 
project delivery. 
 
 
[0.8] 
Mostly lack of control within 
Deutsche Bahn. 
 
 
[0.2] 
Electronic Health Card, 
Germany 
Severity = 0.2 
Mandatory cards for all those with 
statutory insurance - does not 
deliver the information required, 
just personal information; cost 
(since 2006) until 2015: €1bn. 
Main change to existing card: 
picture ID, health information 
from 2018. 
Limited political interest, largely 
to promote networked health 
services and less abuse. 
 
 
 
[0.2] 
Largely a conflict in autonomous 
sector, no involvement by federal 
government; civil rights protection 
meant no political support - 
accusations that opposition by doctors 
largely about protecting own 
privileges. 
 
[0.2] 
Operating company delivering 
project criticised for relying on 
industry with earlier failures. Main 
issue was the complexity of PIN 
numbers that is seen as patient 
unfriendly and useless 
information/outdated technology. 
 
[0.4] 
None 
 
 
 
 
[0.1] 
National Identity Card 
Scheme (2002-2010), 
UK 
Severity = 0.6 
Scheme scrapped in May 2010, 
having cost an estimated £4.5 
billion during its lifetime, never 
having been fully rolled out. 
Plans for an identity card 
scheme announced by the Home 
Secretary in July 2002 in the 
aftermath of the 9/11 attacks and 
increased concern over the 
threat of terrorism. 
 
Political pressures resulted in  
changes in project scope: 
“changing focus has resulted in 
a lack of clarity regarding the 
likely technology requirements” 
(PASC 2006. 19). 
 
[0.6] 
Proposals were introduced without 
proper consultation. ID cards scheme 
was eventually abandoned after change 
in government in 2010. (Chair of the 
PASC was not permitted to inspect the 
risk register of the ID cards 
programme.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[0.4] 
ID cards scheme was initially 
intended to be based on a 
centralized computer database. 
(This plan was later abandoned, 
with information being stored on 
three existing systems.) Danger of 
“function creep” for the database 
(Home Affairs Committee 2004, p. 
X), with new components added in 
relation to other policies (e.g. ID 
cards for foreign nationals). 
 
 
 
[0.8] 
Reliance of the Home Office on 
external expertise in ICT (PASC 
2006, p. 64). It paid PA Consulting 
£14.2 million for work on the ID 
cards scheme “because it did not 
have “ready access to certain skill 
sets and resources necessary for 
implementation of a large and  
complex project such as Identity 
Cards” (PASC 2006, p. 11). 
 
 
 
 
[0.8] 
Sochi 2014 Winter 
Olympics (2007-2014), 
Russia  
Severity = 0.4 
Cost escalated from the planned 
$12 billion to over $51 billion (an 
increase of around 400%). 
Project conceived as a grand 
legacy project for President 
Putin, and as a high prestige 
global event.  
 
 
[0.9] 
Clientalistic politics whereby private 
investors in Olympic venues were able 
to transfer their toxic assets to the state 
after the event to avoid losses. State 
disinterested or unable to act against 
corruption (e.g. kickbacks).  
[0.8] 
Ambitious designs for venues and 
infrastructure of the Games. 
Delays in completion of the ski 
jump (site for the ski jump was 
technically challenging due to 
unstable subsoil). 
[0.4] 
Problems with corruption and 
embezzlement contributed to cost 
overruns. Relative absence of cost 
controls or careful management due 
to Sochi being a prestige/legacy 
project for the president.  
[0.2] 
 
  
Table A2: Truth Tables, Outcome: Severe Blunders 
 Conditions Outcome N Incl PRI 
Case 
Hyper-
Excitement 
Constitutional 
Dysfunction 
Adverse 
Instrument 
Choice 
Low 
Administrative 
Capacity 
Severe 
Blunder 
   
Millennium Dome, Carrier Strike 1 1 1 1 1 2 0.979 0.923 
Berlin Airport 1 0 0 1 1 1 0.957 0.778 
Elbe, Sydney Opera House, 
Edinburgh Trams, Scottish 
Parliament, 'Big O', Australian 
Parliament, Universal Credit, 
Identity Card Scheme (UK) 
1 0 1 1 1 8 0.946 0.900 
Concorde 0 0 1 0 0 1 0.826 0.273 
TollCollect, London 2012, 
Bibliothèque nationale de France, 
Stuttgart 21 
1 0 1 0 0 4 0.817 0.353 
Eurofighter, Big Dig, WestCoast 
Rail Franchise 
0 0 1 1 0 3 0.800 0.500 
Transrapid, Sochi 2014 1 1 0 0 0 2 0.780 0.182 
Channel Tunnel, Electronic Health 
Card (Germany) 
0 0 0 0 0 2 0.775 0.000 
  
Table A3: Truth Tables, Outcome: Not Severe Blunder 
 Conditions Outcome N Incl PRI 
Case 
Hyper-
Excitement 
Constitutional 
Dysfunction 
Adverse 
Instrument 
Choice 
Low 
Administrative 
Capacity 
Not Severe 
Blunder 
   
Channel Tunnel, Electronic Health 
Card (Germany) 
0 0 0 0 1 2 1.000 1.000 
Transrapid, Sochi 2014 1 1 0 0 1 2 0.951 0.818 
Concorde 0 0 1 0 1 1 0.935 0.727 
TollCollect, London 2012, 
Bibliothèque nationale de France, 
Stuttgart 21 
1 0 1 0 1 4 0.900 0.647 
Berlin Airport 1 0 0 1 0 1 0.848 0.222 
Eurofighter, Big Dig, WestCoast 
Rail Franchise 
0 0 1 1 0 3 0.800 0.500 
Millenium Dome, Carrier Strike 1 1 1 1 0 2 0.745 0.077 
Elbe, Sydney Opera House, 
Edinburgh Trams, Scottish 
Parliament, 'Big O', Australian 
Parliament, Universal Credit, 
Identity Card Scheme (UK) 
1 0 1 1 0 8 0.511 0.100 
 
  
Table A4: Simplifying Assumptions for the Parsimonious Solution, Outcome: Severe Blunder 
Conditions 
Hyper-Excitement 
Constitutional 
Dysfunction 
Adverse Instrument 
Choice 
Low Administrative 
Capacity 
1 1 0 1 
 
Table A5: Simplifying Assumptions for the Parsimonious Solution, Outcome: Not Severe Blunder 
Conditions 
Hyper-Excitement 
Constitutional 
Dysfunction 
Adverse Instrument 
Choice 
Low Administrative 
Capacity 
0 1 0 0 
0 1 1 0 
1 0 0 0 
1 1 1 0 
Table A6: Necessary Conditions for Severe Blunder 
Disjunction Inclusion 
Relevance of 
Necessity 
Coverage 
(I) 0.929 0.679 0.766 
(~C) + (A) 0.953 0.540 0.669 
(~C) + (~I) 0.906 0.452 0.646 
(C) + (A) 0.921 0.681 0.765 
(~H) + (A) 0.906 0.670 0.752 
(H) + (~A) 0.906 0.600 0.714 
(H) + (A) 0.976 0.519 0.709 
(H) + (~C) 0.961 0.333 0.629 
(~H) + (~C) + (~A) 0.906 0.409 0.628 
Note: hyper-excitement (H), constitutional dysfunction (C), adverse instrument choice (I), low administrative capacity (A) 
  
Table A7: Necessary conditions for Not Severe Blunder 
Disjunction Inclusion 
Relevance of 
Necessity 
Coverage 
(I) + (~A) 0.922 0.415 0.546 
(~C) + (~A) 0.971 0.377 0.552 
(~C) + (~I) 0.990 0.406 0.573 
(~C) + (I) 0.913 0.338 0.511 
(~H) + (~A) 0.942 0.789 0.776 
(~H) + (I) 0.903 0.445 0.550 
(H) + (~C) 1.000 0.283 0.531 
(C) + (I) + (A) 0.903 0.336 0.505 
(H) + (~I) + (A) 0.922 0.341 0.516 
(H) + (I) + (A) 0.913 0.294 0.495 
Note: hyper-excitement (H), constitutional dysfunction (C), adverse instrument choice (I), low administrative capacity (A) 
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